Internal Problems Facing the New Soviet Leadership by Miller, George
In terna l P r o b l e m s F a c i n g the 




Since the death of Lenin in 1924, the Soviet Union has lived 
through three distinct phases. The first was the Stalinist period, re-
membered by the Party for the continual purges amongst its ranks. 
Second was the Krushchev era which, by its reforms and reorgani-
zations, threatened the existence of the privileged party nomenkla-
tura—those entitled to all manner of material benefits. Finally, we 
have recently seen the end of the Brezhnev period, distinguished by 
domestic inertia2 and the strengthening and modernization of the 
armed forces. The eighteen years of Brezhnev rule have seemed, 
outwardly, a period of domestic stability and security. But behind a 
veneer of calm, a host of problems have gone unaddressed so that 
the new leadership faces many serious difficulties overdue for remedy. 
By avoiding change, Brezhnev has willed his successors some embar-
rassing debts. 
This article examines some of the USSR's internal problems and 
advances the idea that the Soviet system may alter radically and rapidly 
within the present decade. This proposal is in contrast with most 
Western analyses, which view change in Soviet policies as gradual, 
predictable and limited. 
Domestic Problems 
Even before Brezhnev's death, there were signs of pressure within 
the party hierarchy to move away from a policy of extreme conserv-
atism. This antagonism manifested itself in public with anti-Brezhnev 
statements—such as the article which ridiculed Brezhnev in the De-
cember 1981 edition of Aurora.2 Such criticism was not invariably 
destructive and negative in nature. There was one tendency in the 
hierarchy that proposed constructive, alternative policies.3 However, 
both the destructive and the positive critics shared one belief: the 
problems which had developed in the USSR could not be solved within 
the contemporary political and social climates. 
Problems now facing the new leadership cover a wide range in-
cluding the economy, social and moral decay, centrifugal forces within 
the USSR, relations with Eastern Europe and China, and army morale. 
Reports on the Soviet economy'1 indicate fundamental problems exist 
side-by-side with vast natural wealth. 
The economic burdens are huge. Defence spending of all kinds 
now takes between 14 and 17 percent of Soviet GNP.5 Soviet subsidies 
to Eastern Europe are now also substantial, estimated at some 3,374 
million dollars in 1981.6 The Soviet Union also is committed to sup-
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plying annually 10 million tonnes of oil to Cuba, fighting an expensive 
guerilla war in Afghanistan, and financially supporting revolutionary 
regimes in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
As if this were not enough, that year's third bad harvest in a row 
saddled Soviet planners with a bill of at least 10 million million dollars 
for the import of 43 million tonnes of grain, large quantities of sugar, 
potatoes, soya, meat, butter and other agricultural goods. Further-
more, the terms of trade have now moved against the Soviet Union. 
Greater fuel efficiency, higher interest rates and the recession in the 
Western world have reduced the demand for the Soviet Union's main 
hard currency exports.7 
Formal rationing, a rarity until the mid 1970s, had by 1981 taken 
hold in many parts of the USSR. The extent of the rationing depended 
on the distance of the consumer from the farm. In the cities along 
the Volga, consumers were rationed to two kilos of meat a month. In 
Siberia there were reports of rationing down to half that amount. If 
one compares this with the average three kilos per month consump-
tion of meat by Poles it is obvious why the Russians were not impressed 
by pleas from these starving allies. Butter, margarine, cooking oil, 
soap, sugar fruits (if available) were also reported to be tightly rationed 
in parts of the Soviet Union. The supply of vegetables was worse last 
winter than for many years. Shortage of bread has been reported and 
official propaganda has urged people not to be wasteful with wheat 
and flour and not to feed the subsidized bread to livestock. Never-
theless, in the main cities, visitors have seen signs of improved living 
standards, and it remains difficult to judge accurately the real state 
of food supplies across the Soviet Union.8 
The USSR is also running down its deposits with Western banks 
and borrowing more to pay for Western equipment going into the 
Yamal-Western Europe gas pipeline. Large credit deals have recently 
been confirmed with Sweden, France, Germany and Holland.9 How-
ever, because of US opposition, this valuable source of foreign cur-
rency—the Soviet gas pipeline—is now likely to cost more and take 
longer to build than originally planned. Until 1982 the USSR had not 
borrowed heavily on the Western credit market; this was due to the 
rising currency earnings of the Soviet Union. Now, however, these 
earnings are under serious pressure, the exportable oil surpluses are 
dropping and the gas exports will not fully compensate until the end 
of this decade at the earliest. Moreover, 72 percent of Soviet hard 
currency earnings came from energy exports in 1981.10 The problem 
for the Soviets is, therefore, how to pay for the technological imports 
that are needed by the economy when there is no obvious way in 
which the foreign currency can be earned. 
If problems were restricted to the economic situation alone, there 
might be possibilities for gradual reform of the system. But added to 
the economic problems the Soviet system has several others. The 
ruling regime, now over 60 years old, has reached a state of senility 
far beyond its actual age. This is true not only of the chronological 
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age of the Soviet leadership, but of the sociological age of the system 
itself. From the youthful enthusiasm of the early Bolsheviks, to the 
powerful maturity under Stalin, and the middle-aged fussiness of 
Krushchev's reign, the regime under ^Brezhnev settled into a dod-
dering, sclerotic decline. The USSR under Yuri Andropov may at-
tempt to regenerate its lost dynamic. Yet, the leadership trend towards 
old age has hardly been reversed. 
Under Brezhnev, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism became the 
measuring stick of conformity rather than the youthful dynamo to 
the great classless tomorrow. In the USSR people say one thing, do 
another and think a third. As Vladimir Bukovsky points out, "The 
first convinced Marxist I ever met was when I deported to the West."11 
This lack of fundamental belief has led to two developments: a growth 
of social decay and a revival in religious and national identities.12 The 
decline in the ideology and the official toleration of flourishing black 
market activities13 have had strong repercussions on the social envi-
ronment. Corruption has become ingrained in the system itself and 
recently there has been official evidence that inflated figures are far 
from new in Soviet economic practice.14 Nor has corruption been 
confined to the lower orders of society. It seems that on 27 December 
1981 diamonds were stolen from the home of a female lion-tamer 
with the famous Moscow circus and were found in the possession of 
Boris Buryatiya, a singer in the choir of the Bolshoi Theatre. The 
complications arose because Boris, known as "the Gipsy" (Tsigan), was 
notorious for his flamboyant life style and for boasting of his immunity 
from arrest as the current "close friend" of Brezhnev's daughter Gal-
ina, 53. She in turn is married to Lieutenant General Yury Churbanov, 
First Deputy Head of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) police, 
which was investigating the theft. 
The nature of the case brought in the KGB, which has long been 
attempting to stamp out bribery and speculation in valuables and hard 
currency. According to "inside reports", the KGB's Deputy Head Se-
men Tsvigun himself took the dangerous decision to arrest Buryatiya 
without consulting the Politburo but was taken to task by a furious 
Mikhail A. Suslov, the ideological purist, determined to suppress any 
scandal. Tsvigun was told pointedly that he had no future and on 20 
January 1982 committed suicide. He was 64, young enough in the 
milieu of the Soviet leadership. Within days of raging at Tsvigun, the 
story has it, Suslov himself had a stroke and died.15 
Buryatiya was arrested on 29 January 1982, when Brezhnev and 
the other leaders were attending Suslov's funeral. Buryatiya impli-
cated Galina and the national director of Soviet circuses, Anatoly 
Kolevatov, who was arrested on 17 February when diamonds and 
foreign currency worth over $1 million were discovered in his flat. 
He had made a practice of accepting "presents" from performers 
allowed to travel abroad. There were other high-level scandals, one 
involving Brezhnev's son Yuri.16 
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Drunkenness is another major problem. A Soviet factory near 
Moscow, which employed 3,000 workers, decided to crack down on 
its labour force arriving unfit for work in the morning. The result of 
the campaign was that over 700 workers were disciplined for drun-
kenness at work.17 Alcoholism is also considered the main cause of 
rising death rates in almost every age group. Average life span for 
males, for example, has fallen from 66 in 1960 to 62 in 1981. Women 
have not been spared—on average they can be expected to live to 68 
today, compared to 73 a decade ago.18 Throughout the rest of the 
industrialized world, modern amenities like medicine, clean water and 
improved diet have brought radical improvement in longevity. In the 
USSR, however, the situation has deteriorated since 1965. These con-
ditions have almost certainly contributed to the sickness problem among 
infants. ' 
Infant mortality is rife throughout the Soviet Union. A US Census 
Bureau report by Christopher Davis and Murray Feshbach shows that 
even on conservative analysis deaths are now taking place at a rate of 
35 per 1,000 births,19 two and a half times the British rate. Birth 
defects are also alarming. The number of genetically defective chil-
dren in state care is rising at a rate of 200,000 a year, that is, 3 percent 
of all children born in 1980 were born mentally or physically hand-
icapped.20 
Social decay is also reflected in the family unit. Dr. Tremel of 
Duke University has pointed out that a Soviet urban family spends 
the same percentage of its family income on alcohol as an American 
spends on food.21 Therefore it is not surprising that over 60 percent 
of marriages end in divorce within the first year.22 The high divorce 
rate has led to a sharp decline in birth rates. In 1980 the Soviet Union 
had more abortions than any other country and three times as many 
as the USA. According to Soviet statistics, many women have six to 
eight abortions during their lifetimes.23 Some have as many as fifteen. 
Soviet medical reports put the ratio of abortions to live births between 
two and a half to one, and four to one. Of course, this also reflects 
the difficulty of obtaining contraceptives. 
The economic and social pressures to have abortions are also 
strong. Over 60 percent of first abortions occur among 19 to 26 year 
olds, often unmarried students and workers living in hostels and com-
munal flats who are unable to support a child. Many married women 
have regular abortions after the first child because their flats are too 
cramped and two parents' earnings are too low to afford a larger 
family. Other disincentives include poor family allowance, limited 
space in nurseries and day centres, as well as the high divorce rate. 
This social decay has resulted in the rise of crime and disorder. 
Mugging and petty crime (judging from the amount of articles ap-
pearing in the Soviet press on the subject as no official figures are 
available) have increased dramatically in the last few years. In extreme 
instances teenagers have killed their peers to steal their Levi jeans.21 
Of course crime is a global problem, by no means confined to any 
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one social system. However, the problem for the Soviets is that these 
tendencies show no signs of decreasing. On the contrary, they are on 
the increase, while the resources necessary to deal with these problems 
are decreasing. Social programmes are the first to suffer cuts in any 
system. 
Health spending is easily cut, points out Nick Eberstadt. Con-
cluding his study on Soviet medicine, he says: "During the 1980s it 
may become increasingly clear that we are witnessing a wearing down 
of the [Soviet] system. Those who would discount the effects of the 
Soviet health crisis on international politics, or would see within that 
crisis only incentives for an inward turn in Moscow's attentions, should 
also consider whether this unhappy situation might have profound 
consequences for the rest of the world as well."2"' 
It seems obvious that the Soviet system as it has survived for the 
last decade—a conservative, cautious, doddering society—must radi-
cally and fundamentally alter in the present decade. The Economist has 
argued that "This breakdown of Communism as an internal economic 
system may bring counter-revolution before the end of this century, 
but it does not make Russia's nervous apparatchiks more eager to 
surrender to external financial pressure now."26 The Russian anti-
Communist Naroda Trudovoi Soyuz Rossiskikh Solidoristov (Alliance 
of Russian Solidarists, generally known by its initialization NTS) puts 
the point with greater clarity. Its statement says: 
It is the considered opinion of the NTS that the Soviet regime 
is inherently metastable. This is, above all, a result of the accel-
erated obsolescence of the regime itself, an irreversible and ex-
ponential process. Both inaction or any conceivable action open 
to the regime only accelerates this process. Any attempt by the 
West to stabilize the Soviet regime, whether by economic assist-
ance, diplomatic face-saving or political concessions, will, at best, 
have only cosmetic results. At worst, they compound the problem 
by granting the Soviet leadership foreign policy gains with which 
to mask the internal deterioration.27 
Internal Opposition Forces 
One can argue, therefore, that the problem for the Western world 
is no longer merely how to stabilize the Soviet regime, and dissuade 
it from aggression by building military alliances to contain the Soviet 
empire, but to look at possible alternatives which exist today in the 
USSR, on which a post-Andropov Russia could be built. Within the 
general climate of discontent caused by the inadequacies of Soviet 
life, there are five distinct tendencies with which the regime has to 
deal. They are: the emigrants, the dissidents, the technocrats, the 
non-Russian nationalist currents, and the movement for spiritual and 
national rebirth. Each is discussed in turn. 
The emigrants. Quantitatively estimated at 1-3 million, this 
group consists predominantly of Jews and ethnic Germans.28 Its 
main concern and the object of its activism is emigration and 
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assimilation in Israel, in West Germany or in other industrial 
countries. Its outward orientation makes the "emigrant" group 
particularly visible to the Western observer but irrelevant in terms 
of the Soviet Union's political future.29 
The dissidents. A highly visible and articulate group with a 
number of well-known spokesmen increasingly to be found abroad. 
Socially, this group consists almost exclusively of persons from 
the relatively privileged Soviet upper-middle class. The "dissi-
dents" have a distinctly elitist inclination to distrust the average 
citizen and his ability to use freedom constructively. They either 
profess one or another variety of socialist convictions, or take 
an aggressively non-political stand; essentially, they do not chal-
lenge the legitimacy of the Communist dictatorship. They ask 
this dictatorship to become benevolent and to extend those rights 
which will benefit primarily the upper-middle class.30. The ex-
clusion of the "unenlightened masses" from most dissidents' con-
cern is reflected in their choice of which human rights to defend. 
Thus, of the 30 articles in the UN Declaration, No. 13.2 (freedom 
to travel abroad) and No. 19 (freedom of expression) are em-
phasized, while such articles as No. 21 (right to participate in 
public affairs, free elections, secret ballot) and No. 23.4 (freedom 
to form independent labour associations) are usually ignored.31 
This isolation from the average man is the central weakness of 
the "dissident" movement. 
The technocrats. A highly pragmatic group from the Soviet 
upper class, secure in the knowledge that they and their skills 
will earn them a privileged position under any regime, the 
"technocrats" are motivated primarily by their opposition to the 
bungling and inefficient party management. They are to be found 
in the armed forces, as well as in the scientific and industrial 
establishment.32 The "technocrats" are not particularly demo-
cratic by conviction, but they recognize the necessity of democ-
ratization as a way to improve productivity, to achieve economic 
growth, and to bridge the technological gap.33 They also realize 
that the slogan "to overtake and surpass the USA" is funda-
mentally false, since they are aware of the crucial decisions facing 
the leading industrial nations in the fields of ecology, energy, 
consumer patterns, etc. They see their most important task in 
charting a short-cut, without blind emulation of the West and 
learning from its mistakes, thus leading the USSR to a point in 
the future towards which the developed nations of the world 
are inevitably heading. 
The movement for "spiritual and national rebirth." Unlike the 
"dissident" movement, with its narrow base but many well-known 
spokesmen, this is a mass movement with few prominent flag-
bearers. Its main components are a religious revival and a growth 
of national awareness. In both areas, interrelated and often over-
lapping, an increasing activism finds an echo in a large and 
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growing segment of the population. To note one figure as an 
indication, the officially listed members of the Russian Orthodox 
Church alone number 30 million.34 In a political system where 
religion is always a handicap and often grounds for persecution, 
these are impressive figures. Some of the most widespread and 
sustained underground activity (mutual assistance, printing and 
distribution, proselytizing, smuggling religious texts from abroad) 
is to be found in this "renaissance" milieu. Lately an increase in 
open forms of activism can be noted, such as the formation of 
committees for the defence of believers' rights. The Russian 
"national awareness" movement ranges from such quasi-offi-
cially tolerated figures as the painter Ilya Glazounov and the 
writer Vladimir Soloukhin,35 to such officially condemned fig-
ures as Nobel laureate, exiled author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 
the imprisoned publicist Vladimir Osipov,36 underground leader 
Ogurtzov,37 and many others. Most recent samizdat publications 
(Vetche, Moskovski Sbornik, 37, etc.) reflect tendencies of the na-
tional or religious currents in the "renaissance" movement. Dr. 
Richard Pipes, advisor on Soviet affairs to the National Security 
Council, has noted the significance of the Russian nationalist 
tendency. Dr. Pipes argues that, 
The people who now run the Soviet Union are really very 
hawkish, and the alternative to them is not a still more 
hawkish group, but rather a group that is more reform-
minded. These are dedicated, intelligent Russian nation-
alists who believe that a hostility to the U.S. and confron-
tation abroad may have become counter-productive: they 
worry whether the Soviet economy can support such egre-
gious imperialism. I think it is worth a gamble to support 
those elements.38 
Two well-known Soviet writers, V. Sosnora39 and Vladimir So-
loukhin,10 have published with Possev Publishing House in West 
Germany. This Russian émigré publishing business is closely 
associated with the Russian opposition party, Narodo Trudovoi 
Soyz (NTZ), which Yuri Andropov as Head of the KGB once 
described as "Enemy Number 1 of the Soviet State."41 
Prior to the death of Brezhnev, at least, Sosnora and Soloukhin 
had not been arrested nor had they been deprived of the Soviet 
writers' union membership, a strange twist of policy or fate. 
The non-Russian "nationalist currents". Without differentiating 
between federalist and separatist currents, it is safe to assume 
that a great majority of the non-Russian Soviet citizens seek a 
more distinct national identity. The Lenin formula, "national in 
form, socialist in substance," proved highly unsatisfactory. Rad-
ically new principles for relationships between ethnic groups in 
the USSR are necessary and must be found—a task beyond the 
capacity of the Communist regime. 
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The fundamental characteristics of the "renaissance" and the non-
Russian nationalist currents are their massive base, accelerating growth, 
and the durability of their appeal. They express opinions and emo-
tions which will not only endure after the demise of dictatorship, but 
will also determine, to a great extent, the political makeup of a post-
Communist USSR. This fact applies particularly to the Central Asian 
minority groups who are an increasing force both economically and 
politically. The growth of Asian economic and political power is pri-
marily due to their relative demographic increase in relation to the 
Slav population of the USSR. 
Domestic Trends 
A number of points can be drawn from the loosely collated pieces 
of information. First, the facts do all indicate that Brezhnev's period 
of status quo in domestic policy was coming to an end even before his 
death. Secondly, the eclipse of the Brezhnev era coincides with some 
serious structural problems within the Soviet economic, political and 
social systems which cannot be solved within the old Brezhnev con-
ceptual framework. Thirdly, at no time since the 1920s has the Soviet 
Empire been so susceptible to pressure from within or from abroad, 
for the economic and financial links with the outside world as well as 
the growth of consumer demand within the USSR have proved dif-
ficult factors to ignore. Finally, the Soviet Union is today witnessing 
a wide array of groupings developing within the very structure of its 
own elite society, which are in contradiction of the official Party line 
and at times radically hostile to the foundations of Marxism-Leninism. 
These groupings are not what the Western world has come to un-
derstand by the term dissident, although there are dissidents who 
share the notions of what has been described as the "upper under-
ground." 
Yuri Andropov probably feels secure in relation to the KGB and 
MVD, important instruments of power in the USSR. It would seem 
from his early statements and apparent accord with the Defence Min-
ister, Dmitri Ustinov, that he has the support of the armed forces, 
even though this may be at the price of continued high defence ex-
penditures. Andropov's control over the Party has yet to be consoli-
dated, but his short period as secretary between leaving the KGB and 
becoming Party Chairman seems to have been well spent. His main 
problem, one that has also exasperated such Western leaders as Ron-
ald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, may be the bureaucracy. An 
honest assessment might elevate this self-serving, all-powerful but 
amorphous mass to "Enemy No. 1 of the Soviet State," yet it is the 
inevitable creation of Marxism-Leninism, just as the lesser Western 
counterparts are the legacies of democratic socialism. Reports suggest 
a powerful thrust is being planned by Andropov to make the Soviet 
bureaucracy work efficiently. It is because the writer believes this to 
be an impossible task that he predicts change in Soviet society of a 
more profound character. If, as seems to be the case, Andropov com-
bines his striving for greater efficiency with a drive against ideological 
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and political impurity, the internal tensions within the Soviet Union 
seem certain to increase.42 Moreover, the extent and the direction of 
change in the USSR can be influenced by the Western democracies. 
This begs a bigger question. 
A Role for the West? 
Should the West become involved in Soviet internal development? 
At present, the democracies tend to evade this question. Only with 
the Reagan Administration is there a sincere desire to operate across 
the broad spectrum of political activities sometimes described as "low 
intensity conflict" to change the course of Soviet affairs. Yet, it may 
be felt, no country that values democracy and truth has the moral 
right to deny these benefits to the Soviet and East European people, 
any more than our denying life to millions of Jews in Nazi Europe 
by our failure to comprehend and respond to the holocaust can be 
condoned. Moreover, since the Soviets conduct incessant ideological 
and political warfare against the West, our failure to respond weighs 
the scale heavily in Moscow's favour, perhaps making full-scale war 
more likely. President Reagan has said: 
. . . the Soviet Union is not immune from the reality of what is 
going on in the world. It has happened in the past: a small ruling 
elite either mistakenly attempts to ease domestic unrest through 
greater repression and foreign adventure or it chooses a wiser 
course—it begins to allow its people a voice in their own des-
tiny . . . What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the 
long term—the march of freedom and democracy which will 
leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history as it has left 
other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-
expression of the people.43 
If the West is serious in such an intention, we shall have to analyze 
the various forces which can influence change in the Soviet Union. 
As Dr. Shtromas has pointed out, "To adequately prepare and meet 
this change one must first of all be aware of the possibilities of change 
and all its variations. This can be achieved only by a thorough study 
and scrutiny of Soviet and East European societies from the point of 
view of the trends making for change."41 Once this has been done 
one has to look at the tools which are available to influence the di-
rection and the extent of change in the USSR. In the writer's opinion, 
this should be given high priority. 
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